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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2019 fiscal year, the U.S. Department of State issued over eight
million temporary work visas.1 The Federal Election Campaign Act’s
(“FECA”) foreign nationals prohibition prevents each of these individuals
from contributing campaign funds to U.S. candidates at the local, state, and
federal levels because they lack lawful permanent residence in the United
States.2 The FECA authorizes the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”)
and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to bring civil or criminal enforcement
actions, respectively, against individuals who contribute campaign funds in
violation of the foreign nationals prohibition.3 Enforcement actions may be
brought against both the party accepting a donation from an individual of
foreign national status and the individual contributing funds to a campaign
as a foreign national.4
A successful criminal enforcement action under the FECA requires the
government prove the defendant “knowingly and willfully” violated the
law.5 However, courts reviewing FECA violations demonstrate a lack of
1. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, FY2019 NONIMMIGRANT
VISA DETAIL TABLE 42 (2019), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/NonImmigrant-Statistics/NIVDetailTables/FY19NIVDetailTable.pdf.
2. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (prohibiting campaign contributions from temporary
residents, foreign principals, and individuals lacking lawful permanent residence); Myles
Martin, Foreign Nationals, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (June 23, 2017), https://www.fec.
gov/updates/foreign-nationals/ (outlining the prohibited campaign activities and
contributions for foreign nationals).
3. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(C), (a)(5), (a)(6), (d)(1) (creating separate civil and
criminal penalties for various election offenses, including for violations of the foreign
nationals prohibition).
4. See id. § 30121(a).
5. See id. § 30109(d)(1); Andy Grewal, The DOJ Quietly Made Campaign Finance
Violations Easier to Prosecute, YALE J. REGUL. (May 3, 2018) [hereinafter Grewal, The
DOJ Quietly Made Campaign Finance Violations Easier to Prosecute], https://
www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-doj-quietly-made-campaign-finance-violations-easier-toprosecute-2/ (explaining that the FECA’s “knowingly and willfully” violation standard
creates a high bar for prosecution).
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unanimity when addressing the requisite mens rea sufficient to satisfy the
knowing and willful violation standard of the statute.6 As the U.S. Supreme
Court indicated when it affirmed the district court’s decision in Bluman v.
FEC,7 the foreign nationals prohibition creates unique obstacles for the
government to prove the intent necessary to obtain a criminal conviction.8
In May of 2019, the Ninth Circuit heard United States v. Singh9 and
affirmed the convictions of a foreign national donor and a recipient of funds
for violating the foreign nationals prohibition.10 However, the Ninth Circuit
failed to consider factors indicative of the donor’s foreign national status or
the recipient’s knowledge thereof,11 clouding any remnants of clarity for the
foreign nationals prohibition’s mens rea standard. In failing to find actual
knowledge, the Ninth Circuit set a dangerous precedent for the FECA’s
intent standard for criminal liability because the factors relied on by the
Ninth Circuit are not indicative of foreign national status and will have
inadvertent and disadvantageous impacts on the electoral participation of
individuals, entities, and corporations.12
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on foreign involvement in Singh obscured the
distinction between the foreign nationals prohibition and how domestic
subsidiaries of foreign corporations function under the prohibition because
the court’s analysis failed to address the status of the donor as an individual
or entity.13 The FEC should revisit the proposed regulation outlining
6. See, e.g., United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2015)
(requiring that the defendant only have a general awareness that his conduct was illegal);
United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 568 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring the government to
prove that the defendant had specific intent to commit the crime); United States v.
Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472, 486 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“‘[K]nowingly’ is a ‘general
intent’ mens rea standard . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1193 (2013).
7. 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012).
8. See id. at 292 (cautioning reviewing courts against the adoption of the ordinary
mens rea standard for the foreign nationals prohibition because both the recipient and the
donor may have ignorance of the law and a language barrier).
9. 924 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2019).
10. See id. at 1047 (considering involvement with a foreign corporation and foreign
election in favor of constructive knowledge of the donor’s foreign national status).
11. See id. (relying solely on factors which would indicate constructive knowledge).
12. Compare id. (weighing factors indicative of foreign business transactions and
foreign electoral involvement in favor of the recipient’s actual knowledge), with 52
U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1) (criminalizing a recipient’s acceptance of contributions from a
foreign national only if the donor “knowingly and willfully” violates the statute), and 11
C.F.R. § 110.20 (2020) (stating that a recipient may meet the knowing and willful
violation standard through actual knowledge or constructive knowledge).
13. See Monica Sanders, Relations Between International Companies and Their
Subsidiaries, HOUS. CHRON., https://smallbusiness.chron.com/relations-between-inter
national-companies-subsidiaries-24591.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) (defining
multinational corporations and their subsidiaries and explaining how and why they are
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constructive knowledge as sufficient to satisfy the FECA’s mens rea
requirement and restrict judicial analysis to provide crucial clarity to the
requisite mens rea of recipients, donors, individuals, entities, and
corporations.14
Broadly, this Comment addresses the intent standard under the FECA’s
foreign nationals prohibition through the court’s analysis in Singh.15 Part II
provides the necessary background on the FECA, the intent standards the
government must prove to successfully prosecute a criminal violation of the
FECA, the foreign nationals prohibition, Circuit Court decisions analyzing
the mens rea for FECA violations, and Singh. Part III analyzes the intent
standard outlined in Singh, where the Ninth Circuit held a campaign
contribution recipient criminally liable under the foreign nationals
prohibition despite his presumption that the donor was a lawful citizen.16
Part IV recommends that the FEC revise or eliminate the constructive
knowledge prong of the foreign nationals prohibition and require actual
knowledge of the donor’s foreign national status to satisfy the FECA’s intent
standard.
II. SAFEGUARDING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS:
FINDING ENFORCEMENT POWER AND VIOLATORS
In 1867, the U.S. Congress began its initial attempts to restrict campaign
financing and combat candidate reliance on funds from wealthy donors.17
However, the turn of the twentieth century marked a proliferation of
legislative concern with consolidated fiscal involvement in politics.18
Despite legislative efforts to expand the legal framework surrounding
campaign finance, many early efforts lacked efficacious enforcement
mechanisms.19 It was not until Congress granted the FEC exclusive
formed).
14. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, PROPOSED STATEMENT OF POLICY: APPLICATION
OF THE FOREIGN NATIONAL PROHIBITION TO DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS OWNED OR
CONTROLLED BY FOREIGN NATIONALS AND SAFE HARBOR FOR KNOWLEDGE STANDARD
13 (2016) [hereinafter FEC, PROPOSED STATEMENT OF POLICY] (stating that the FEC
need not promulgate additional rulemaking to close the gaps between the foreign
nationals prohibition and domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations because there is
no evidence that the current statutory framework is defective).
15. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1044–48.
16. See id. at 1044–45, 1047.
17. See 106 CONG. REC. S12,928 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Moynihan) (recognizing that the Naval Appropriations Bill of 1867 began initial attempts
to restrict campaign funds).
18. See Matt A. Vega, The First Amendment Lost in Translation: Preventing
Foreign Influence in U.S. Elections After Citizens United v. FEC, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
951, 967–68, 971 (2011) (citing Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864).
19. See Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System
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enforcement power under the FECA that the beginnings of the campaign
finance legal framework became marginally compulsory.20
Congress amended the FECA in the 1970s to further restrict money in
politics and specifically target foreign involvement in U.S. elections.21 The
FECA provisions defined foreign national status and subsequently
prohibited foreign nationals from contributing to campaigns altogether.22 In
2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”),
attempting to combat foreign involvement in elections by providing
enforcement mechanisms to hold both the foreign actors and domestic
recipients criminally liable.23 Harmonization of the FECA and BCRA
frameworks occurred when the FEC revised its regulatory framework to
mirror the BCRA and facilitate efficient regulatory enforcement actions
under the new legal framework.24
A. Intent Under the FECA
For a court to hold a defendant criminally liable under the enforcement
prong of the FECA, the defendant must “knowingly and willfully commit[]

in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 279, 281 (1991) (stating the FEC lacked
effective enforcement mechanisms and disclosure requirements before the FECA).
20. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEC REPORT TO THE COMMITTEES ON
APPROPRIATIONS ON ENFORCING THE FOREIGN NATIONAL PROHIBITION 3–4 (2018)
[hereinafter FEC, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEES ON APPROPRIATIONS] (explaining that the
FEC may bring enforcement actions sua sponte, as Matters Under Review, or through
Alternative Dispute Resolution); Vega, supra note 18, at 971–72 (noting that Congress
failed to give the FEC essential mechanisms to combat the growing role of money in
politics).
21. See FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1267
(1974); FECA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, §§ 323, 324, 90 Stat. 475, 493
(1976); see, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (providing limitations on campaign contributions
and expenditures); id. § 30121 (prohibiting contributions both to and from foreign
nationals); id. § 30122 (prohibiting campaign contributions in the name of another).
22. See FECA Amendments of 1974 § 101 (defining a noncitizen as an individual
unlawfully residing in the United States, or a corporation with a foreign principal); FECA
Amendments of 1976 §§ 323, 324 (repealing the statute that placed the foreign nationals
prohibition under the criminal code); see also Vega, supra note 18, at 971–73 (noting
that Congress amended the FECA in 1974 to no longer permit direct donations from
foreign nationals or corporations to candidates).
23. Compare Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 303,
116 Stat. 81, 96 (holding both recipients of funds from foreign nationals and foreign
nationals criminally liable), with 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (holding donors and recipients
criminally liable regardless of their status).
24. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEES ON APPROPRIATIONS,
supra note 20, at 1–2. Compare 36 U.S.C. § 510 (prohibiting individuals of foreign
national status from contributing to the presidential inaugural committee), with 52 U.S.C.
§ 30121(a) (prohibiting individuals of foreign national status from contributing to
elections).
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a violation.”25 Reviewing courts consider the knowing and willful prongs in
tandem, not with individualized attention to each prong.26 Thus, when the
government seeks criminal liability against both the recipient and the donor,
the government must offer evidence that both the individual of foreign
national status and the recipient of the contribution intended to violate the
law when accepting and/or making the contribution.27
The FEC set forth a narrowly tailored three-pronged test to determine if a
recipient knows of the donor’s foreign national status.28 While not
exhaustive, the FEC considers whether a recipient has knowledge of a
donor’s foreign national status based on the following factors: a foreign
passport, foreign bank transfers, and a foreign address.29 No factor is
dispositive, and a campaign contribution recipient may ascertain knowledge
of the donor’s foreign national status based on one or none of the factors.30
The government seldomly prosecutes campaign violations under the
foreign nationals prohibition, and those prosecutions rarely reach the
sentencing phase.31 As one of the few cases brought under the foreign
nationals prohibition, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Singh to uphold the
district court’s finding was instrumental in determining how foreign
corporations could exert influence in elections.32 The Eighth and Ninth
Circuits found individuals criminally liable under the FECA and relied on
one of two interpretations to determine intent under the FECA: (1) whether
a defendant generally recognized that his conduct was unlawful; or (2)
whether a defendant knew his conduct violated a specific law.33
25. 52 U.S.C. § 30109; see also L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45320,
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGISLATION 32–33 (2018).
26. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 152–
55 (Richard C. Pilger et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017).
27. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(2).
28. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(4) (2020) (providing that a violator of the foreign
nationals prohibition knows of the foreign national donor’s status through one of the
following: (1) actual knowledge; (2) constructive knowledge indicating a substantial
probability of foreign national donor status; and (3) constructive knowledge that would
lead a reasonable recipient to inquire into donor status); see also WHITAKER, supra note
25, at 32–33.
29. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(5).
30. See id.
31. See Sean J. Wright, Reexamining Criminal Prosecutions Under the Foreign
Nationals Ban, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 563, 577–78 (2018) (stating
that the sentencing guideline for FECA violations, U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2C1.8 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018), “has only been applied fifty-nine times in the last
decade [and] [n]one have involved a foreign national”).
32. See id. at 582–83.
33. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–94 (1998) (explaining that
cases involving technical legal language require knowledge of the specific legal
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i. The Bryan Standard
In Bryan v. United States,34 the U.S. Supreme Court pioneered the analysis
for knowing and willful intent standards under the U.S. Criminal Code.35 In
Bryan, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the defendant for
engaging in the sale of firearms without a federal license.36 The defendant
argued that although he dealt firearms, he failed to meet the willfulness
standard for intent because he was unaware of the specific federal licensing
requirements at the time he dealt the firearms.37 The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the defendant’s argument that his actions failed to meet the
willfulness standard of intent because the following facts supported the
jury’s finding that the defendant willfully violated the statute: he used an
intermediary to acquire firearms he would not otherwise be able to obtain,
filed off the serial numbers, and sold the firearms on a street known for drug
trafficking.38 The U.S. Supreme Court held that a statute with a “willfulness”
requirement does not require specific intent unless the statute itself is highly
specialized and implicates seemingly innocent conduct.39
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that proof of knowledge that
an act would surmount to a criminal offense, rather than knowledge of the
specific statutory provision, was sufficient to satisfy the knowing and willful
standard.40 Thus, the Court rejected the defendant’s request to overturn
precedent and apply the ignorance of law defense, which states that the
defendant may be immune from liability when he was unaware that his
actions violated any law.41 Since the foundational decision regarding
knowing and willful crimes in Bryan, reviewing courts have largely applied

provision); United States v. Benton, 890 F.3d 697, 715 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F.
Supp. 2d 472, 486 (E.D. Va. 2011), rev’d on other grounds 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012).
34. 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
35. See Robert D. Probasco, Prosecuting Conduit Campaign Contributions — Hard
Time for Soft Money, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 841, 864 (2001) (elaborating that Bryan set forth
a new standard that would require prosecutors merely to show the defendant knew his
actions were culpable).
36. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 189, 193.
37. Id. at 189–90.
38. See id. at 193 (requiring the defendant only to have “acted with knowledge that
his conduct was unlawful” to meet the “willfulness” requirement of criminal conduct).
39. Id. at 194, 196–98.
40. See id. at 193 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994))
(explaining that facts brought before the defendant would bring them into the realm of
the statutory definition).
41. See id. at 194–96 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 138, 149 (1994);
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991)) (explaining that the exception would
not extend to facts where the plaintiff already knew the conduct was unlawful).
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this standard for criminal FECA violations.42
ii. Circuit Courts Interpreting Bryan’s Knowing and Willful Conduct
Standard Under the FECA
In grappling with the knowing and willful standard, three key decisions
found that the Bryan standard applied to the FECA. In United States v.
Danielczyk,43 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
determined that the FECA was not an overly technical statute that required a
heightened mens rea standard.44 In reaching that conclusion, the court
considered the DOJ’s prosecution of the defendants for illegally soliciting
and disbursing campaign contributions during Hillary Clinton’s 2006 and
2008 senatorial and presidential campaigns.45 The defendants promised to
reimburse the donors for the campaign contributions and attempted to
conceal the reimbursements by relabeling the contributions as “consulting
fees” and back-dated letters to create a paper trail for the fees and services.46
In assessing the nature of the FECA, the court relied on the Internal Revenue
Code’s reasonable cause defense under section 6664(c),47 clarifying that a
statute requires a heightened mens rea when a defendant could consult the
law and remain unclear as to the requirements placed upon him.48 The court
distinguished provisions in the FECA governing disclosure of campaign
funds from specialized provisions in the Internal Revenue Code because the
defendants demonstrated their knowledge of the conduct’s unlawfulness by
backdating letters and concealing the funds.49 The case was appealed by the
government to the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration, but the court did not
address the mens rea standard under the statute.50
In United States v. Whittemore,51 the Ninth Circuit held that the
government needed to prove that the defendant knew his actions constituted

42. See United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2015). But
see United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567–69 (3d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the
government must prove that the defendant “specifically intended to violate federal law”).
43. 788 F. Supp. 2d 472 (E.D. Va. 2011).
44. Id. at 487–93.
45. Id. at 476.
46. Id.
47. I.R.C. § 6664(c).
48. See Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (citing United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d
1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974)).
49. See id. at 489–92 (stating that criminal tax liability requires that the defendant
voluntarily and intentionally violated the tax code).
50. See generally United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012)
(considering only the constitutionality of a restriction on corporate electoral spending).
51. 776 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2015).
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a crime, but not that the defendant knew of the specific crime he committed.52
The defendant distributed his own funds to employees and relatives and
instructed them to contribute those funds to a candidate in the employees’
names.53
The defendant’s actions circumvented federal reporting
requirements under the guise of several donors.54 However, the defendant
argued that at the time he transferred the funds to his family and friends, he
believed the monetary transfers became unconditional gifts to those parties.55
Despite the defendant’s statutory interpretation, the court determined that he
knew that he was the source of the funds.56 Therefore, the identity of the
ultimate donor was irrelevant to whether the defendant’s conduct was a
knowing and willful violation of the FECA.57 The Ninth Circuit ultimately
determined that the knowing and willful standard was not dependent upon
how each individual interpreted the statute, but the general culpability of the
conduct was sufficient to satisfy the knowing and willful standard.58
In United States v. Benton,59 the Eighth Circuit determined that a
defendant did not need to meet the heightened standard of specific intent for
a successful criminal conviction under the FECA.60 The government offered
evidence that the defendants, Benton and Tate, campaign officials for Ron
Paul during his 2012 presidential campaign, sent an Iowa state senator
money for public endorsement and engaged in a coordinated effort to conceal
the transfer.61 Benton argued that the presence of multiple standards for
willfulness required that the Eight Circuit apply the standard most favorable
to him.62 The defendant’s argument did not persuade the court, which
ultimately found that Benton failed to prove that the FECA fits within the
Bryan standard.63 Benton, as a case demonstrative of the fragmented
application of the Bryan standard to criminal convictions for campaign
finance violations,64 begins the discussion of Bryan’s inapplicability to the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1076–77.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1079.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1080.
890 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 714–15.
Id. at 704, 710.
Id. at 715.
Id.
See Andy Grewal, If Trump Jr. Didn’t Know Campaign Finance Law, He Didn’t
Break It, YALE J. REGUL. (July 16, 2017) [hereinafter Grewal, If Trump Jr. Didn’t Know
Campaign Finance Law], https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/if-trump-jr-didnt-know-camp
aign-finance-law-he-didnt-break-it/.
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FECA.
iii. The Cheek and Ratzlaf Standard
Despite the prevalence of courts applying the Bryan standard when
determining knowing and willful violation of the FECA, many courts do not
apply the standard to highly specialized areas of the law.65 Pioneered in
Cheek v. United States66 and affirmed in Ratzlaf v. United States,67 courts
have held that violations of highly technical statutes require a willful
violation because the public is generally unaware of such statutory
requirements.68
In Cheek v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held a defendant
airplane pilot criminally liable for failing to file his income tax return for five
years.69 The defendant testified at trial that he believed the tax regime was
unconstitutional and that the wages he received were not income to him.70
The Court considered that during the five years the defendant was not filing
his income tax returns, he attended four civil cases challenging the U.S. tax
regime and two trials of individuals charged with violating tax laws.71
Although the Court found that the defendant’s view on the constitutionality
of the law was irrelevant, the Court determined that the misunderstanding of
the law may negate willfulness, even if the misunderstanding is not
objectively reasonable.72
In Ratzlaf v. United States, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada found a defendant criminally liable for structuring his financial
transactions to strategically avoid reporting requirements.73 In that case, the
65. Cf. Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of
Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L. J. 341, 361–63 (1998) (stating that while U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence suggests that complex or technical statutes “may impose a
knowledge of the law requirement” to willfulness, courts have continued to “impose their
own subjective judgments” in deciding when this heightened standard should be
applied).
66. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
67. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
68. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205 (finding that a defendant charged with failing to file
his income tax return and willfully evading taxes requires the government to prove that
he knew of the specific law); Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 146–48 (finding that the court could
not convict the defendant regardless of his knowledge of the illegality of the offense).
But see United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 211–13 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that even
though the defendant did not know the exact statutory provision, was aware reports he
made were false, and that misrepresentation was unlawful, this was not enough to satisfy
the heightened intent standard).
69. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 194.
70. Id. at 195–96, 207.
71. Id. at 195.
72. Id. at 206–07.
73. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137–38 (summarizing the trial judge’s jury instructions

2021

THE FECA'S FOREIGN NATIONALS PROHIBITION

191

defendant incurred a debt in excess of $160,000 at a local casino and had a
week to pay the debt.74 The defendant returned to the casino with $100,000,
but upon arrival was informed by the casino manager that under 31 U.S.C. §
5313 and 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a), both local casinos and financial institutions
must file reports with the Secretary of Treasury for cash transactions over
$10,000.75 To avoid triggering the reporting requirement, the defendant went
to different banks and purchased cashier checks.76 Upon appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Court determined that violations of the anti-structuring
statute, which prohibited structuring transactions in this way to avoid
reporting requirements, were not so inherently “evil” that a court could hold
the defendant criminally liable without specific knowledge that structuring
financial transactions were illegal.77
In United States v. Curran,78 the Third Circuit extended the Cheek and
Ratzlaf standard to the FECA.79 The defendant employer instructed his
employees to write personal checks to potential political officeholders,
reimbursed the employees for their contributions, and gave employees lists
of their colleagues to solicit personal checks from on behalf of candidates.80
The defendant argued that he utilized the aforementioned donation scheme
to avoid other candidates seeking campaign contributions from him, not to
necessarily violate the law.81 The court determined, however, that to hold
the defendant culpable, the government must prove three things: (1) that the
“defendant knew of [his] reporting obligations”; (2) “that he attempted to
frustrate those obligations”; and (3) “that he knew [the] conduct was
unlawful.”82 The court was not willing to extend a general intent standard to
the whole of the FECA because general intent failed to capture whether the
defendant knew his conduct violated the FECA.83 The Third Circuit
ultimately vacated the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania’s judgment because the lower court erroneously instructed the
jury to consider criminal liability under a general intent standard when it
that they did not have to prove the defendant knew this structuring was unlawful, only
that the defendant had knowledge of and attempted to avoid the banks’ reporting
obligations).
74. Id. at 137.
75. Id. at 136–37.
76. Id. at 137.
77. See id. at 146–47 (stating that if Congress had intended absolute liability under
the statute, the structure of the statute would not require both knowledge and willfulness).
78. 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994).
79. See id. at 567.
80. Id. at 562–63.
81. Id. at 563.
82. Id. at 569.
83. Id. at 569–70.
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found the defendant liable for concealing the campaign contributions from
the FEC.84
B. A Cautioning Court: Bluman v. FEC
In Bluman v. FEC, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. District
Court’s consideration of the foreign nationals prohibition and cautioned
against criminal penalties for FECA violations.85 The plaintiffs were lawful
temporary residents of the United States on temporary work visas that
brought this action against the FEC, alleging that the statutory bar violated
their First Amendment rights as temporary residents.86 Ultimately, the court
granted the FEC’s motion to dismiss, stating that the government may
exclude noncitizens from the democratic process because the government
may restrict the rights of those involved in its political community.87 The
U.S. Supreme Court cautioned Congress that criminal penalties for willful
campaign violations require the government to assess the defendant’s
knowledge of the relevant law.88
C. United States v. Singh: The Ninth Circuit Grappling
with the Knowing and Willful Standard
In May of 2019, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision in
United States v. Singh and held a defendant recipient criminally responsible
for receiving a campaign contribution from an individual of foreign national
status.89 Defendant donor, Jose Susumo Azano Matsura (“Azano”), sought
to contribute campaign funds to a California mayoral candidate seeking to
develop the waterfront area near Azano’s residence.90 Azano met the
definition of a foreign national under 52 U.S.C. § 30121 because he was not
a lawful permanent resident of the United States.91 Consequently, Azano
could not legally contribute campaign funds to a candidate under the
FECA,92 and no individual could receive campaign funds from Azano
84. Id.
85. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285–86, 292 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d 565 U.S.

1104 (2012).
86. Id. at 285 (explaining that one plaintiff was a medical resident and dual citizen
of Canada and Israel, and the other was an associate at a law firm).
87. Id. at 292.
88. See id. (stating that there are likely individuals of foreign national status that are
unaware of the foreign nationals prohibition).
89. United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030, 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming the
conviction of a defendant campaign donation recipient under the FECA and foreign
nationals test).
90. Id. at 1040.
91. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(3)(ii) (2020); Singh, 924 F.3d at 1047.
92. Compare 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(3)(ii) (stating that an individual of foreign

2021

THE FECA'S FOREIGN NATIONALS PROHIBITION

193

without facing the potential for criminal liability under 52 U.S.C. § 30121.93
Azano contributed funds through Singh, the CEO of ElectionMall, as an
intermediary recipient, seeking to influence the candidate to advance
development at a waterfront area.94 The lower court convicted Singh under
52 U.S.C. § 30121 for accepting a campaign contribution from a foreign
national.95 Singh’s primary defense was that he lacked knowledge of
Azano’s foreign national status at the time of the transaction.96 Despite
Azano’s foreign national status, he had various ties to the United States
including: a residence in California, his wife and children’s lawful
citizenship, and lawful entrance into the country on a temporary B1/B2
visa.97
In determining that Singh knew of the defendant donor’s foreign national
status, the court considered: the initiation of contact between the defendants
during a foreign election, involvement with a foreign corporation, and
attempts to conceal campaign involvement.98 The Ninth Circuit ultimately
affirmed the lower court’s conviction of both defendants but reversed a count
for falsification of campaign records based on insufficient evidence.99
D. The Impact of the Foreign Nationals
Prohibition on Corporations
After the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its controversial opinion in
Citizens United v. FEC,100 a rising public fear of foreign corporate influence
emerged in the gaps of the foreign nationals prohibition.101 In Citizens
national status includes individuals lacking citizenship or lawful permanent residence),
with Singh, 924 F.3d at 1040, 1047 (applying the foreign nationals prohibition to Azano
because he possessed a B1/B2 visa).
93. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(2); id. § 30109(a)(11); Singh, 924 F.3d at 1040.
94. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1040–41 (explaining that ElectionMall is an organization
providing services to candidates).
95. United States v. Singh, No. 14-cr-00388, 2017 WL 4540747, at *1 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 6, 2017).
96. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 31–32, United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030 (9th
Cir. 2018), (No. 3-14-cr-0388-MMA) (stating that trial court heard testimony from
Singh’s family indicating that they assumed Azano was a legal permanent resident of the
United States).
97. Singh, 924 F.3d at 1040.
98. See id. at 1047 (explaining that each of these factors was indicative of knowledge
and went to the required mental state of Singh when he accepted the donations as an
intermediary recipient).
99. Id. at 1061.
100. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
101. See id. at 372 (overruling precedent and finding that corporations have a right to
political speech under the First Amendment); see, e.g., Micheal Sozan, Ending ForeignInfluenced Corporate Spending in U.S. Elections, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 21,
2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2019/
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United, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a nonprofit corporation’s request
for injunctive relief to prevent the application of BCRA to its film about
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.102 The U.S. Supreme Court
determined that corporate political donations were political speech and
restrictions placed on those contributions must survive strict scrutiny, the
same standard as individuals, and that the BCRA could not limit corporate
funding of the film.103 The majority opinion determined that it need not
assess whether legal limitations on corporate speech applied to foreign
corporations because the plaintiffs brought the case under the provision
preventing corporations from participating in electioneering with funds from
their general treasury, not the foreign nationals prohibition.104 The Court’s
consideration of 2 U.S.C. § 441(e), the former codification of the foreign
nationals prohibition, would unnecessarily limit the holding of the case.105
Justice Stevens’s key concern in his dissenting opinion was that the
majority’s decision afforded equal protection to foreign corporations and
individual U.S. citizens.106 This brief consideration of the foreign nationals
prohibition by Justice Stevens illuminated the public’s growing concern with
foreign involvement in the electoral process.107
III. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS IN UNITED STATES V. SINGH FAILS TO
REFLECT THE REQUISITE MENS REA FOR FECA VIOLATIONS
Although FEC and DOJ enforcement actions of the FECA’s foreign
nationals prohibition are relatively recent in U.S. jurisprudence, reviewing
courts must ensure that the government meets its burden of proof because
the provision has the potential to hold both recipients and donors criminally
liable.108 Each reviewing court must adequately assess the government’s
11/21/477466/ending-foreign-influenced-corporate-spending-u-s-elections/ (explaining
that because the legislature enacted the FECA prior to the U.S. Supreme Court handing
down Citizens United, it left loopholes for foreign corporations with domestic
subsidiaries to impact the electoral process).
102. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321–22.
103. Id. at 371–72.
104. See id. at 362 (stating that the plaintiff brought the case under the provision which
mandated disclosure of certain information instead of the foreign nationals prohibition).
But see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 581, 610 (2011) (stating that upholding the ban on foreign national campaign
contributions after Citizens United would ignore precedent because the ban cannot
require distinguishing foreign and domestic contributions based on normative concerns
rather than legal).
105. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362.
106. See id. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. See Vega, supra note 18, at 956–57.
108. Cf. Gross, supra note 19, at 292 (arguing that administrative and civil
enforcement mechanisms are important to implicate lesser offenses and result in frequent
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allegation that the defendant acted with the requisite mens rea for the crime
as to each party individually; therefore, the court may not consider the
recipient and donor’s mens rea collectively. 109
The Ninth Circuit failed to consider the entire breadth of the recipient’s
mens rea requirement in United States v. Singh in two ways: (1) it neglected
to find that the foreign nationals prohibition falls within the Cheek and
Ratzlaf standard; and (2) it failed to address whether Singh had actual versus
constructive knowledge of the donor’s foreign national status.110 The Ninth
Circuit’s omissions will have important implications for foreign corporations
with domestic subsidiaries because corporations often engage in foreign
involvement regardless of principality.111 The Ninth Circuit’s inattention to
the mens rea standard runs the risk of expanding the breadth of criminal
liability under the FECA.112
A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Determine that the Foreign Nationals
Prohibition Falls Within the Cheek and Ratzlaf Standard
The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that the foreign nationals prohibition
statute, when applied to a recipient of funds, becomes highly technical
because enforcement of criminal liability against a violating recipient
requires actual knowledge of the donor’s foreign national status.113 The
foreign nationals prohibition falls within the highly technical statute
exception set forth in Cheek and Ratzlaf because Singh’s defense extended

enforcement action); Jeffery K. Powell, Prohibitions on Campaign Contributions from
Foreign Sources: Questioning Their Justification in a Global Interdependent Economy,
17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 957, 963 (1996) (stating that campaign finance laws fluctuate
in clarity and mens rea requirements); Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Obstacles
to Effective Enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 575,
579–87 (2000) (arguing that enforcement of the FECA remains stunted by budgetary
constraints and dual civil and criminal penalties).
109. See Gross, supra note 19, at 293–94 (explaining that intent for FECA violations
is difficult to prove and results in the DOJ bringing very few effective criminal
enforcement actions).
110. See United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2019).
111. See, e.g., Dov H. Levin, Partisan Electoral Interventions by the Great Powers:
Introducing the PEIG Dataset, 36 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 88, 92, 96–97 (2016)
(outlining the variety of political motives the United States may have for intervening in
foreign elections, particularly wartime initiatives).
112. Cf. Nick Thompson, International Campaign Finance: How do Countries
Compare?, CNN (Mar. 5, 2012, 4:54 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/01/24/world/glob
al-campaign-finance/index.html (demonstrating through explorative examples that
international campaign finance is common and presents unique challenges to global
governance).
113. See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2011) (arguing that the
foreign national test may be different from other FECA violations because even the
individual of foreign national status may not know of the prohibition).
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beyond ignorance of the law.114 Similar to the defendant in Cheek, general
awareness of the relevant provision was not sufficient to hold the defendant
criminally liable because he operated under the good faith belief that his
conduct was not within the confines of the statute.115 In Curran, the court
determined that an individual must know of his specific reporting
requirements and attempt to frustrate those obligations.116 The government
alleged that Singh had knowledge of his obligation not to accept the donation
from the donor and sufficiently attempted to frustrate that obligation.117
However, even if Singh had a general awareness of the FECA or the foreign
nationals prohibition, he was unaware of the donor’s citizenship status or that
he would fall within the statute and its corresponding criminal penalties.118
As stated in Ratzlaf, the defendant’s conduct was not sufficiently
blameworthy to eliminate the willfulness analysis entirely.119
The Ninth Circuit was required to apply the Cheek and Ratzlaf standard to
determine whether Singh met the heightened mens rea standard under the
foreign nationals prohibition because Singh’s conduct was similarly facially
noncriminal if the defendant lacked knowledge that the donor was of foreign
national status.120 Statutes operating under the Cheek and Ratzlaf standard
require a heightened mens rea because they run the risk of implicating
conduct that would otherwise be legal.121 Singh’s conduct, as to the charge
114. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 204–05 (1991) (explaining that even
if the defendant disagreed with the formation of the law and the underlying
constitutionality, his only legal defense was that he “believed in good faith that” he was
exempt from filing personal income taxes); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 138
(1994) (explaining that even though the defendant knew there was a law requiring
reporting of transactions over $10,000, he was not necessarily on notice that structuring
transactions to avoid the reporting requirements would subject him to criminal penalties).
115. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 194–95, 206 (explaining that the defendant was involved
in at least four civil trials related to taxes).
116. See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567–68 (3d Cir. 1994) (expressing
concern with holding laypersons criminally liable for campaign finance violations, a
highly specialized area of the law).
117. See United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2019) (stating that the
acceptance of a donation from an individual of foreign national status provides legal
grounds for prosecution under 52 U.S.C. § 30121).
118. See id. at 1044 (stating that a criminal violation of the FECA requires that the
defendant “knowingly and willfully” violate the statute).
119. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 146–47 (stating that a crime may not be subject to a
heightened intent standard when the crime is of an “evil” nature “irrespective of the
defendant’s knowledge”).
120. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1045; 52 U.S.C. § 30121; see also Curran, 20 F.3d at
567–68 (stating that without the defendant’s knowledge that the structuring of financial
transactions was unlawful, he would not sufficiently frustrate those obligations to meet
the mens rea standard).
121. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194–96 (1998) (distinguishing Bryan
from Cheek and Ratzlaf based on the language of the criminal statute, the general
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under 52 U.S.C. § 30121, fell entirely within the Cheek and Ratzlaf standard.
While accepting a campaign contribution from an individual is a noncriminal
act, without U.S. citizenship, that acceptance of a campaign contribution
transforms into a crime under 52 U.S.C. § 30121.122 Thus, the statute
endangers recipients that are not fully aware of the donor’s foreign national
status or do not sufficiently inquire in order to ascertain such a level of
knowledge.123
Singh’s conduct did not fall within the Bryan standard because the conduct
in his case was not accompanied by additional overt acts of illegal activity.124
In Bryan, the defendant’s conduct consisted of several consecutive steps
including: obtaining illegal firearms, filing off the serial numbers, and
selling firearms in a high crime area.125 Singh committed no additional
crimes indicating that he knew the acceptance of a campaign contribution
was illegal, outside of stating that the contribution should maintain a status
of secrecy.126 A generalized intent standard applies to generalized illegal
schemes, as set forth in Bryan.127 Without additional facts, Singh’s conduct
fails to demonstrate an equivalent scheme.128
The Ninth Circuit improperly determined in Singh that the foreign
nationals prohibition involved the same knowledge inquiry for the donor and
the recipient.129 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered a
distinguishable case, Whittemore.130 In Whittemore, the defendant violated
the FECA’s provision prohibiting donors from making donations in the name
of another, requiring only the contributor to have actual knowledge that he

knowledge of the law, and the implication generally).
122. See id.; 52 U.S.C. § 30121; see also Singh, 924 F.3d at 1044 (elaborating that an
essential element of the foreign nationals prohibition is that the defendant knew of the
donor’s foreign national status).
123. See Grewal, If Trump Jr. Didn’t Know Campaign Finance Law, supra note 64;
accord Zachary J. Piaker, Can “Love” Be A Crime? The Scope of the Foreign National
Spending Ban in Campaign Finance Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1857, 1881 (2018)
(explaining that campaign finance regulations require a unique intent standard in order
to satisfy the motive of combatting corruption).
124. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1046; Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194–96.
125. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 189.
126. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1047.
127. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194–96.
128. Compare id. at 189, 194–96 (stating that the illegal act consists of several
sequential steps committed by a single defendant), with Singh, 924 F.3d at 1047
(explaining that there are two defendants in this case that required knowledge of each
other’s actions in order for the conduct to surmount to a crime).
129. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1047 (analyzing part of the “knowing and willful”
standard for the defendant donor and another for the defendant recipient such that they
are synonymous throughout the case).
130. See id. at 1044–46.
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sourced the campaign contributions himself.131 In Singh, the defendant
recipient needed actual knowledge of another’s ability to make a campaign
contribution.132 The facts in Singh are distinguishable because Whittemore
solely required the court to inquire into the defendant’s knowledge of the
law, not whether the other parties were eligible to make campaign
contributions.133 The court’s reliance on this case was improper because
Singh implicates both the recipient and the donor equally under the foreign
nationals prohibition.134 The court’s analysis must consist of two distinct
and complete assessments of knowingly and willfully violating the foreign
nationals prohibition.135
The Singh court failed to consider Danielcyzk, where the donor had actual
knowledge that he made a donation in violation of the law when exceeding
the limitation on corporate campaign expenditures.136 In that case, the court
held the actors criminally liable for reimbursing donors for their individual
contributions.137 Even though the transaction consisted of multiple parties
and the donors, the court did not hold the intermediary recipients criminally
liable for their role in exceeding the corporate campaign expenditures.138
Instead, the court considered the recipient’s involvement in favor of the
defendant concealing the crime.139 The defendant in Singh is not similarly
situated to the defendants in Benton, who offered funds to another in
exchange for a campaign contribution.140 For the conduct to transform into
a crime, the recipient needed no additional information about the
contributors.141 The role of the defendant in Singh as the recipient required
131. See United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2015)
(explaining that the defendant took steps to conceal the donations under the names of his
family and friends by using their names to make the donations and give the appearance
that they are from a different donor).
132. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1044–46.
133. See Whittemore, 776 F.3d at 1078–79 (elaborating that the only consideration
made concerning the intermediaries was whether they thought that the transfer was a gift
to them from the defendant at the time of acceptance).
134. See id. at 1080 (analyzing solely the defendant donor and not any other party’s
knowledge of the law); 52 U.S.C. § 30121; id. § 30109.
135. See Whittemore, 776 F.3d at 1080–81.
136. See United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472, 486 (E.D. Va. 2011)
(explaining that the language of the statute was clear and that the defendant took steps to
conceal the transferred funds in excess of the limitation amount).
137. See id. at 476–78; United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 614 (4th Cir. 2012)
(disguising the donations as “consulting fees” and back-dating letters with modified
amounts to conceal the reimbursement of the fees).
138. See Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (assessing solely what the employees
conceived their instructions were in relation to the funds given by their employer).
139. See id.
140. United States v. Benton, 890 F.3d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 2018).
141. See id. at 714–15 (stating that offering a sum for endorsement of a candidate
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a heightened mens rea standard to satisfy knowledge of the pertinent facts
because the court held both recipient and donor criminally liable for a single
transaction.142
B. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Determine that the Recipient
Knew of the Donor’s Foreign National Status
The Ninth Circuit failed to reach the conclusion that Singh knew or should
have reasonably known of the donor’s foreign national status.143 Instead, the
court relied on three key factors demonstrative of foreign involvement rather
than foreign national status.144
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Singh’s involvement with the donor’s
foreign businesses failed to prove he knew of the donor’s foreign national
status because business relationships are not indicative of a donor’s
citizenship status when globalization has facilitated extensive international
business involvement.145 As enumerated in 11 C.F.R. § 110.20, factors that
indicate foreign national status are as follows: a foreign passport, foreign
bank transfers, or a foreign address.146 Foreign business relationships are
notably different from these enumerated factors because business
relationships are not indicative of foreign principality.147 The involvement
of foreign business is not exclusive or unique to individuals of foreign
national status.148 Reliance on factors universally present across recipient
violates the relevant provision of the FECA regardless of the individuals’ status or
intention behind the exchange of funds).
142. See United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030, 1044–47 (9th Cir. 2019).
143. Id. at 1045.
144. See id. at 1047 (considering factors not of foreign status of the donor, but of
involvement in foreign business); cf. Grewal, If Trump Jr. Didn’t Know Campaign
Finance Law, supra note 64 (arguing that the foreign nationals prohibition requires a
heightened standard for mens rea for an agent of Trump whose ignorance of the law may
be a defense to a violation of the foreign nationals prohibition).
145. See Emilio Carrillo Gamboa, Globalization of Industry Through Production
Sharing, in GLOBALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 86, 86–87
(Janet H. Muroyama & Guyford Stever eds., 1988) (stating that globalization in the
market has emerged to such an extent that business relationships can no longer be
indicative of principality).
146. 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a) (2020).
147. See Rick Newman, Why U.S. Companies Aren’t So American Anymore, U.S.
NEWS (June 30, 2011, 3:58 PM), https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/
2011/06/30/why-us-companies-arent-so-american-anymore (stating that corporations
may go overseas to avoid taxes, procure cheaper labor, or expand their empire, but this
does not change the principal of the corporation).
148. Cf. Robert E. Litan, The “Globalization” Challenge: The U.S. Role in Shaping
World Trade and Investment, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 2000), https://www.
brookings.edu/articles/the-globalization-challenge-the-u-s-role-in-shaping-world-tradeand-investment/ (advocating for a heightened U.S. role and responsibility in shaping the
future of global organizations and economies through its involvement with and influence
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status diminishes the efficacy of the foreign nationals prohibition because it
fails to illustrate the intent of the recipient.149
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Singh interacting with the donor during a
foreign election fails to prove Singh knew of the donor’s foreign national
status because foreign electoral involvement is not indicative of the donor’s
immigration status or residence.150 This factor would not put Singh on notice
of the donor’s foreign national status.151 Involvement in a foreign election
may surmount to notice of foreign status when the donor runs for public
office in a foreign country,152 but the facts the government presented to the
court failed to allege that Singh’s involvement in foreign elections escalated
to candidacy.153
The Ninth Circuit properly relied on Singh’s concealment because the
enforcement mechanism under the FECA explicitly states that concealment
may weigh in favor of an offender’s knowledge of unlawful conduct.154 This
consideration would weigh against Singh because he sent emails to the donor
indicating his desire not to leave a paper trail.155 Singh’s concealment was
of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization).
149. Cf. Douglas A. Hass, Employers and Immigration Law: Be Careful Who You
Hire — and Who You Don’t, 101 ILL. BAR J. 360, 361, 372 (2013) (demonstrating the
dangers of constructive knowledge tests for knowledge of illegal working status).
150. See Scott Shane, Russia Isn’t the Only One Meddling In Elections. We Do It,
Too., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/sunday-rev
iew/russia-isnt-the-only-one-meddling-in-elections-we-do-it-too.html (outlining the
U.S. historical precedent for intervening in a foreign election when it achieves political
and economic incentives); Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Participation of NonCitizens in the U.S. Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 509
(1997) (stating that the passage of the foreign nationals prohibition attempted to target a
perceived problem that could not be eliminated by an outright ban of foreign funds and
came with new enforcement issues); see, e.g., Melissa Gomez, Trump Said It’s OK to
Take Campaign Dirt from Foreign Powers. Is It Legal?, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2019,
10:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-2020-trump-foreign-electioninterference-20190615-story.html.
151. See Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, US Interfered in Elections of at Least 85 Countries
Worldwide Since 1945, GLOB. RSCH. (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.globalresearch.ca/usinterfered-in-elections-of-at-least-85-countries-worldwide-since-1945/5601481 (stating
that between 1946 and 2000, the United States interfered in approximately eighty-one
elections).
152. Cf. Advice About Possible Loss of U.S. Nationality and Seeking Public Office in
a Foreign State, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/Advice-aboutPossible-Loss-of-US-Nationality-Dual-Nationality/Loss-US-Nationality-ForeignState.html (“A U.S. national’s employment . . . with the government of a foreign
country . . . is a potentially expatriating act . . . .”).
153. See generally United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030, 1047–50 (9th Cir. 2019)
(limiting the defendant’s foreign electoral involvement services performed in Mexico
City to the 2011 presidential election).
154. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a) (detailing the procedures for enforcement).
155. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1052; see also Gross, supra note 19, at 294 (stating that
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similar to the defendant’s in United States v. Danielcyzk, where the
defendant back-dated letters to mask the donations as “consulting fees.”156
The defendant in Danielcyzk, however, had actual knowledge that he
transferred the funds to another person.157 Singh accepted an otherwise
lawful transfer.158 Without sufficient mens rea, the court may not properly
hold Singh criminally liable under the FECA.159
Collectively, the factors considered by the court failed to indicate Singh’s
knowledge of the donors’ foreign national status at the time Singh accepted
the campaign contribution.160 Under the test outlined in Curran, Singh must
have: (1) known of his duty not to accept a donation from the donor; (2)
attempted to frustrate that duty; and (3) known accepting the donation was
unlawful.161 Singh cannot meet any factors of the Curran test because he
was unaware of his duty not to accept the campaign contribution without
actual knowledge of the donor’s foreign national status.162
C. The Ninth Circuit Filling the Gaps in the Foreign
Nationals Prohibition Left After Citizens United v. FEC
The divergence of these factors from those listed under 11 C.F.R. § 110.20
creates a heavy burden on campaign contribution recipients from here forth,
particularly for foreign corporations with domestic subsidiaries.163 As the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia cautioned in Bluman, holding
parties criminally liable under a knowing and willful standard for accepting
campaign contributions proves challenging because it requires a duality of
knowledge: knowledge of the law and knowledge of another’s immigration
concealing an FECA violation generally weighs against a defendant when he egregiously
violates the statute).
156. See United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472, 496 (E.D. Va. 2011).
157. See id. at 480.
158. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1043.
159. See Grewal, The DOJ Quietly Made Campaign Finance Violations Easier to
Prosecute, supra note 5 (arguing that the knowing and willful standard attempts to
combat the high mens rea requirement for FECA criminal prosecutions and has permitted
the DOJ to increase flexibility in FECA prosecutions).
160. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2020) (explaining that factors indicative of citizenship
include documentation, public awareness of foreign status, and usage of foreign banks,
but distinguishing foreign corporations with domestic subsidiaries as involving foreign
corporate involvement); Singh, 924 F.3d at 1045; Martin, supra note 2 (listing knowledge
of a donor’s foreign passport in favor of a recipient knowing a donor’s foreign national
status).
161. See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 1994).
162. See Singh, 924 F.3d at 1050.
163. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, PROPOSED STATEMENT OF POLICY, supra note 14,
at 14–15 (stating that recipient of campaign contributions from foreign corporations with
domestic subsidiaries will assumedly conduct a reasonable inquiry for the foreign
nationals test).
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status.164 The U.S. Supreme Court briefly mentioned the foreign nationals
prohibition in Citizens United v. FEC, but notably absent from both the
Stevens and the majority opinions are clarifications of the foreign national
test and the constructive knowledge prong for corporations.165 The Ninth
Circuit considered factors that were largely met by domestic subsidiaries of
foreign corporations, regardless of the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to
restrict this type of political speech.166
Domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations often engage in foreign
elections as a mechanism to influence favorable policies.167 Domestic
subsidiaries are often involved in business with foreign corporate entities
because their corporate structure and globalization incentivize international
and broadscale transactions.168 These factors impede legislative intent to
distinguish the role of corporate speech under the foreign nationals
prohibition because U.S. citizens and corporations are routinely involved in
foreign business transactions and foreign elections.169 The court’s failure to
adequately address the corporate role within the foreign nationals prohibition
blurs the lines between recipients, donors, and their respective corporate
equivalents.170
164. See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that
imposing criminal penalties for FECA violation requires the court to assess knowledge
of the law, creating a difficult standard for the courts to exact on recipients and donors
of campaign contributions).
165. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (stating that the
Court need not reach the foreign nationals prohibition because the lower court’s decision
may be overruled on other grounds).
166. See CYNTHIA BROWN & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44447,
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE ETHICS OF ELECTED OFFICIALS: REGULATION
UNDER FEDERAL LAW 4–5 (2016) (stating that FEC guidance on the foreign nationals
prohibition does not apply to foreign corporations with domestic subsidiaries).
167. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 112 (providing a comparative study of corporate
involvement across democratic nations and stating that corporate involvement is not
uncommon outside of the United States).
168. See Sanders, supra note 13. But see Defining the Future of Campaign Finance
in an Age of Supreme Court Activism: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on H. Admin.,
111th Cong. 70 (2010) (arguing that the FECA already presents large gaps in the foreign
nationals prohibition for corporate interference).
169. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, PROPOSED STATEMENT OF POLICY, supra note 14,
at 7 (quoting Contribution Limitations and Prohibitions, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,943–44 (Nov.
19, 2002) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 102, 110)) (“The Commission based its decision
‘upon the lack of evidence of Congressional intent to broaden the prohibition on foreign
national involvement in U.S. elections . . . .’”); cf. Jieun Lee, Foreign Direct Investment
in Political Influence 5 (Oct. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.inter
nationalpoliticaleconomysociety.org/sites/default/files/paper-uploads/2018-10-2821_42_07-leejieun@umich.edu.pdf (stating that the FEC has characterized foreign PACs
as “instruments of the US employees of foreign-owned companies”).
170. See Ben Freeman, America’s Laws Have Always Left Our Politics Vulnerable to
Foreign Influence, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2019, 10:23 AM), https://www.washington
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IV. RESOLVING AND CONSOLIDATING THE FOREIGN NATIONALS TEST
The nature of the foreign nationals prohibition is such that it encompasses
a wide array of foreign actors and entities.171 The foreign nationals
prohibition’s definitional structure applies to entities, corporations, and
individuals, but its sanctions fail to distinguish between recipients and
donors.172 Recipients of campaign contributions from a foreign national are
subject to the sanctions for accepting a campaign contribution, but the
recipients are not prohibited from making contributions themselves, a
distinction the structure of the statute fails to reconcile.173
A. A Clearer Definition of Foreign National
The governing statutes surrounding the foreign nationals prohibition
requires further definitional clarity with caveats for corporations, recipients,
and donors.174 Although 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 seeks to provide some clarity to
the required mens rea for a recipient to knowingly accept funds from a
foreign national, efforts to develop analyzing case law are largely stunted by
the high bar for criminal violations of the FECA.175 Rather than permitting
the reviewing courts to analyze factors that do not support a heightened or
ordinary mens rea standard for the crime, the legislature should revise the
post.com/outlook/americas-laws-have-always-left-its-politics-vulnerable-to-foreigninfluence/2019/10/18/3fb7db62-f0f3-11e9-89eb-ec56cd414732_story.html (claiming
that it is difficult to discern whether foreign PAC spending stems from domestic or
foreign revenue).
171. See Martin, supra note 2 (including temporary residents, foreign corporations
with domestic subsidiaries, and recipients of foreign campaign contributions).
172. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (defining a foreign national as either a corporation with
a foreign principal or an individual who is not a lawful permanent resident of the United
States).
173. Cf. Sozan, supra note 101 (critiquing the structure of the foreign nationals
prohibition due to its inability to recognize that foreign and domestic interests diverge);
Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign Finance Regulation?, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1421, 1437 (2018) (quoting Nathan J. Muller, Reflections on the Election
Commission: An Interview with Neil O. Staebler, AM. ENTER. INST. (Apr. 5, 1979),
https://www.aei.org/articles/reflections-on-the-election-commission-an-interview-withneil-o-staebler/) (characterizing the FEC as a flawed and “captive province” of Congress,
overly influenced by incumbent politics).
174. See Robert Kelner et al., Compliance with Ban on Contributions from Foreign
Nationals, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (May 5, 2016), https://www.cov.com/-/media/
files/corporate/publications/2016/05/compliance_with_ban_on_contributions_from_for
eign_nationals.pdf (stating that although foreign national status appears facially
straightforward, the definition contains applicative ambiguities).
175. See Robert Lenhard, The FEC Revisits the Ban on Foreign Nationals’ Financing
of American Elections, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (June 20, 2017), https://
www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2017/06/20/fec-revisits-ban-foreign-nationals-financingamerican-elections/ (stating that enforcement of the foreign-nationals prohibition is
largely dependent on the Commissioners’ interpretation).
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prohibition in 52 U.S.C. § 30121 and provide explicit provisions for: (1)
donors of foreign national status; (2) recipients of foreign national status; and
(3) domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations.176
Explicit provisions would increase the clarity of the foreign nationals
prohibition and outline the burden placed on a third party accepting a
campaign contribution. Enumeration of these provisions would eliminate
the court’s reliance on 52 U.S.C. § 30121’s correction provision, which
requires a recipient to return a donation if they acquire knowledge of the
donor’s foreign national status because the violating recipient is unlikely to
engage in a subsequent status inquiry after obtaining a donation.177
B. Including Language on Actual Versus Constructive Knowledge
The legislature should amend 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 to provide a more
holistic view of the mens rea requirement for campaign contribution
recipients.178 It is particularly difficult to determine whether a recipient knew
of a donor’s foreign national status upon receipt of a donation.179 Thus,
courts must have a fully developed analytical framework, not merely the
non-dispositive enumerated list provided in 11 C.F.R. § 110.20.
The foreign nationals test provides explicit indicators of citizenship, but
prong three of 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 only requires a defendant to have
constructive knowledge sufficient to spark an inquiry into a donor’s
citizenship status.180 Cohesivity between these two tests would assist courts
in implementing the foreign nationals prohibition against recipients in
subsequent cases because it would acknowledge the current immigration
structure.
V. CONCLUSION
The foreign nationals prohibition serves an essential function, namely to
insulate the U.S. electoral process from corrupt foreign intervention.181
176. See Corey R. Sparks, Note, Foreigners United: Foreign Influence in American
Elections After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 62 CLEV. STATE L. REV.
245, 253 (2014) (stating that Citizens United failed to remedy the convergence of the
foreign nationals prohibition with foreign corporations with domestic subsidiaries).
177. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121.
178. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2020); Rick Hasen, Will Trump Jr’s Ignorance of
Campaign Finance Law Let Him Off the Hook? What About Manafort?, ELECTION L.
BLOG (July 16, 2017, 10:47 AM) [hereinafter Hasen, Will Trump Jr’s Ignorance of
Campaign Finance Law Let Him Off the Hook?], https://electionlawblog.org/?p=93877
(explaining that as written, FECA mens rea requirements have extensive gaps for those
ignorant of the law to avoid criminal liability).
179. See WILLIAM THOMAS, ADVERSE REPORT, H.R. Rep. No. 106-297, at 40–41
(1999) (permitting a constructive knowledge standard to avoid willful blindness).
180. 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a)(5); Thomas & Bowman, supra note 108, at 596.
181. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10697, FOREIGN MONEY AND U.S.
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Enforcement of the foreign nationals prohibition has varied,182 but
enforcement actions are hindered by the generalized standard of intent for
corporations, donors, and recipients alike, irrespective of their interactions
with and proximity to the donor.183 Each of these groups and entities will
necessarily have different intents and abilities to obtain knowledge of the
donor’s citizenship status.
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on foreign involvement in United States v.
Singh obscured the distinction between the foreign nationals prohibition and
the domestic subsidiaries exception because the court’s analysis failed to
address the status of the individual and corporate donors.184 Thus, the FEC
should revisit the regulation, outline how constructive knowledge may
satisfy the mens rea standard, and restrict judicial analysis to provide clarity
as to the requisite mens rea of recipients, donors, and corporations.185
These steps will provide additional safeguards to effectively ensure that
individuals lacking sufficient knowledge of a donor’s foreign national status
either become aware of sufficient facts to reject the donation altogether, or
are exempt from criminal liability.186 In sum, the FEC must insulate the
electoral process from corrupt foreign powers, and Congress and the FEC
must revisit the foreign nationals prohibition and the standard for knowing
and willful violation thereof.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY 2 (2019) (stating that in response to Russian involvement in
the 2016 elections, enforcement of the foreign nationals prohibition will likely increase
in the near future).
182. Wright, supra note 31, at 578.
183. See Kelner et al., supra note 174.
184. See Sanders, supra note 13.
185. See Hasen, Will Trump Jr’s Ignorance of Campaign Finance Law Let Him Off
the Hook?, supra note 178.
186. See generally United States v. Singh, 924 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding
both the donor and recipient liable for violating the foreign nationals prohibition).

